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have given only a sample. Likewise in regard to the other most important chapter, that numbered x and relating to Austria's participation in Napoleon's downfall, we can give only an instance or two. Here Dr. Rose works at second-hand, relying on the biographies of Austrian diplomatists in part, and in part on the state papers printed by Austrian historians from their own archives, apparently as accessible to natives and not more open to strangers than those of London. Two facts are emphasized: that twenty years of military failure had left Austria impoverished; that in 1813 she had really far more to fear from the czar than from the emperor Napoleon. It seems proved that Metternich really desired peace, and that his offer of friendly intervention in April was sincere. Napoleon rejected it for both military and dynastic reasons. Then for the first time, about July, Austria for self-preservation framed her policy of armed mediation. The declaration by the emperor Francis of war on his son-in-law, the methods by which he used his own child to secure state secrets, the subsequent behavior of Maria Louisa, these in connection with numerous unedifying details have combined to place Francis in a very dark light at the bar of history. If the Austrian emperor actually sacrificed natural affection and inclination to the interests of his people as is indicated above, the judgment of posterity will eventually be modified if not reversed. Finally we call attention to the confirmations that Dr. Rose's gleanings afford of the fact that the armistice which Napoleon granted at Poischwitz while the allies consulted was the verge of his undoing. Had he driven his foe onward to Glatz, as was well within his power, and so have forced a conclusive struggle there, the event would have favored him almost beyond a peradventure. To reject the moderate terms formulated by the Congress of Prague was possibly a grave fault; probably, however, it would have been a more serious one to accept a sovereignty limited by European consent. Had he made the first step backward in 1813 after the awful diminution of prestige due to 1812, there might have been delay in the Napoleonic decline, but the chances are that nothing short of an impregnable military power could ever have supported his authority. The decline of that military power dates from the fateful armistice. A movement carefully studied and based on sound considerations, both diplomatic and military, proved futile only and solely through an error of military judgment. This error was due to his fatal conviction that Austria, facing an ultimatum, would again yield to his iron will as she had so often done before.

*The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy and the Rise of the Secret Societies.* By R. M. JOHNSTON. (New York: The Macmillan Company; London: Macmillan and Company. 1904. Two vols., pp. xxi, 408; ix, 232.)

To recount the events and conditions of the Two Sicilies is the most disheartening labor which to-day confronts the serious student of nine-

teenth-century Italian history. Published sources are not wanting, but those that are trustworthy are few, while critical research has here most of its work yet to perform. Public and private archives are rich in documents, but they have been little studied, and their publication remains in most part a work for the future. Deficiency of enthusiasm for Italian unity, and a mercurial discontent with government, may account in part for the failure of students in southern Italy to exploit the sources of their recent history. Perhaps the want of a high-class and enterprising Neapolitan publisher has contributed to the same result; certainly De Cesare and Ravaschieri, the most recent Neapolitan historians of note, have found their publishers outside the boundaries of the ancient kingdom.

The Napoleonic empire, the restoration, and the revolution of 1820 are as deficient in published material as the later Neapolitan periods of the century, and the writing of the present volumes, intended for the serious general reader, demanded courage, as well as historical enterprise. Sicily has been excluded from the narrative in order to give it greater unity, and because despatches of Lord Bentinck remain shut up in British secret archives. However, Sicilian relations have been outlined when necessary, and the account does not lose by the exclusion. Mr. Johnston frankly admits the limitations of his work in the face of inadequate sources, but believes that his account is in "the broad outline substantially true". He has certainly done a useful piece of work; the English reader no longer need depend on the English translation of Colletta, a primary source, but very untrustworthy, an apology and a series of libels rather than a history. Mr. Johnston's narrative is entertaining, and exhibits breadth of view and considerable discernment. Unfortunately, evidence of haste and carelessness in preparation is not wanting. Some of his sketches are well done, and he has put in relief facts often neglected. The importance of Naples in the Napoleonic plan he emphasizes effectively, perhaps in some disproportion, but he justly remarks that it has been passed over too lightly in histories of wider scope. It is not a slight merit that he keeps the larger European situation well in view. His conception of the real significance of the secret societies and of their mission is notably just and well stated. On the other hand, many of his appreciations of individual characters are open to criticism. Thus it is difficult to admit that Zurlo is worthy of "the foremost place among the patriots and statesmen of southern Italy" (II, 121). A tendency to undervalue Italian historians is noticeable, as is an excessive veneration for the learned but partizan Austrian historian of modern Italy, Helfert, who is complimented as being in a class by himself (II, 204). Many statements that are made are striking and suggestive, although they are sometimes contradictory or loosely expressed and do not bear the stamp of deliberate and exhaustive criticism. Jablonowsky, the Austrian minister at Naples, is described as too profound a diplomat to commit himself by advising the Neapolitan government on the deliberated fate of Murat in October, 1815 (I, 403-

404). He therefore found a diplomatic excuse for absenting himself from Naples. Further on, however, is it stated that Jablonowsky, "far below the average of Austrian diplomatic ability . . . had been officially reproved for not having assumed a purely neutral position in the question of the fate of Murat" (II, 54).

It is unfortunate that authorities for specific statements are not more frequently cited in foot-notes. On many facts and opinions, given by Mr. Johnston with all assurance, the best evidence is conflicting. The reader's confidence would have been increased had such conflict of authorities always been noted, and had the writer's position been substantiated. Perhaps more of such references were made in Mr. Johnston's original manuscript, of which, he tells us in his preface, four-fifths was irrevocably lost while out of his hands, and had to be rewritten without opportunity to consult many of his sources. From this misfortune the work has certainly suffered materially. In the original version, we are informed, there were "passages, extracts, and notes that were taken directly from the original material", found in researches among manuscript sources, particularly in the national library and state archives of Naples, and in the British War Office and the British Admiralty. Such quotations would have added greatly to the force of the work, and would perhaps have saved some errors. However, the loss of his original manuscript cannot excuse Mr. Johnston in the occasional foot-notes and in his bibliography for quoting falsely the statements of his accessible printed authorities. For example, he says (II, 217), "The theory of the conspiracy against Murat supported by Zahn, Sassenay, and Lemmi has been effectively answered by Dufourcq and Lumbroso." But the fact is that Lemmi disbelieves in the plot, and the scope of his study is to disprove it, while Lumbroso, instead of effectively answering arguments in favor of the plot, admits the possibility of its existence. Before condemning Lemmi's study (II, 207) as "unimportant", proving nothing, and adding "nothing to the subject", Mr. Johnston might have examined it with sufficient care at least to form a correct idea of the writer's general position, which is declared in neither uncertain nor ambiguous terms. Again, a more intimate knowledge of Italian historical literature would have made it impossible for Mr. Johnston to designate the eminent Piedmontese jurist, Federigo Sclopis, as a Bourbonist.

The bibliography of nearly five hundred titles, which is appended, abounds in errors, and in faults of bibliographical usage. Galvani's *Mémoires*, and *Nouveaux Mémoires*, cited as separate works (II, 202), should have been given as two editions of one work, printed in fact from one set of plates. Corridore's pamphlet was not "written on a newly found proclamation" but on one published over seventy years before by Franceschetti. It is bad bibliographical usage to omit altogether a pseudonym because the author's true name has been discovered, as in the case of Justus Tommasini, pseudonym of J. H. C. Westphal. The notes of the bibliography are descriptive as well as critical; the descrip-

tive part might well have been extended. Taken as a whole, the bibliography is comparatively full, and as a list of titles it is a useful contribution to bibliographical studies of the period. It is unfortunate that all the important sources cited were not laid under contribution in the preparation of the narrative.

H. NELSON GAY.

*A History of the British Empire in the Nineteenth Century.* By MARCUS R. P. DORMAN, M.A. Volume II. *The Campaigns of Wellington and the Policy of Castlereagh (1806-1825)*. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, and Company; Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company. 1904. Pp. xiv, 374.)

MR. DORMAN'S *History of the British Empire*, of which the second volume is now before us, has already won for itself a place of merit in historical literature. It aims to present a consecutive account of British foreign and domestic policy, claiming originality only so far as foreign relations are concerned. In the latter respect it is a contribution of substantial value, even in the presence of the writings of Fyffe and Rose, each of whom had access to the Foreign Office papers. Mr. Dorman has used the same documents with greater skill than did Fyffe in his *Modern Europe* and with greater fullness than did Rose in his *Life of Napoleon I.* For the period to 1825, which marks the close of Mr. Dorman's second volume, he has been able to interweave foreign and domestic policies in a more elaborate discussion than Stern was able to do in his *Geschichte Europas, 1815-1871*, and so to give a treatment of the period that is clearer and fresher than that of the German writer. The attitude assumed throughout is that of a fair-minded and impartial narrator.

Mr. Dorman pays little attention to affairs in France and central Europe. His point of view is always British and his desire is to elucidate the part played by British statesmen and soldiers in continental affairs. He is not writing a history of Europe in the nineteenth century. His work is, therefore, somewhat disproportionate and his handling of other subjects than his own largely conventional. Where he needs to fill in his picture, as he frequently does in the earlier portion, he draws on Rose and Napier for information, strangely enough neglecting entirely Oman's recent work, and occasionally, as in his discussion of the policy of Fox in 1806, he adopts not only Rose's sequence of ideas but even some of his words and phrases. Such a mild form of plagiarism seems unnecessary, since Mr. Dorman does not display in other portions of his history either slipshod scholarship or poverty of thought. He not only elaborates and improves existing accounts, but he introduces a considerable body of new information drawn from the correspondence of British representatives in other countries. He throws light on the Welcheren expedition (pp. 64-65); on the part played by General Chitroff in betraying information to the British government